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VOLUME 44 WINTER, 1959 NUMBER 2
THE WIRETAPPING ENTANGLEMENT: HOW TO
STRENGTHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND PRESERVE PRIVACY
Peter Megargee Brown and Richard S. Peert
During the dog days of July 1958 the nation was diverted by the
highly irregular and equally comic attempt by an investigator of the
House Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight to eavesdrop by means
of an electronic "bug" or detectaphone on the private conversations of
Mr. Bernard Goldfine, a gentleman whose affairs were then under the
subcommittee's scrutiny. It was somewhat less amusing, however, for
the average citizen to learn, on the authority of a United States Attor-
ney, that such activity was under no federal restraint.' He was informed,
on the other hand, that although actual wiretapping of a telephone
conversation is forbidden under federal law, no offense is committed
even in that situation until there has been a divulgence of the informa-
tion so obtained.' Furthermore, the prohibition against telephone tap-
ping extends to federal law enforcement agents3 and apparently to state
police officers armed with court orders for that express purpose who
might be seeking evidence against felons of the most odious variety.4
The outmoded state of law which admits of such paradox would be
obvious to any thoughtful reader. However, as a layman, he could not
be expected to know that he was in contact with an area of our law that
is not only antiquated and paradoxical, but almost hopelessly confused
because of the failure of Congress to recast the law in consonance with
the requirements of a technologically advanced and democratic society.'
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 232, for biographical data.
I N.Y. Times, July 8, 1958, p. 14, col. 1.
2 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952) makes it illegal to intercept telephone
communications and to divulge or use them.
3 Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338 (1939); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
4 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
5 The report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary remarks that " . . No problem
is more perplexing, the source of more legal confusion, or more laden with controversy."




The interception of private communications is not a new problem.
Eavesdropping was the basis of a crime at common law,6 and over two
hundred years ago Parliament forbade the opening of any letter except by
an official armed with a specific warrant for the purpose.7 Incidentally,
the power of the sovereign to intercept letters for the purpose of "dis-
covering many dangerous and wicked designs" had been recognized from
much earlier times.' With the introduction of the telegraph and later the
telephone, attempts were made to safeguard the privacy of communication
in these areas. New York State, for example, has had a statute since the
last century that makes it a crime to intercept a message by connivance
with a telephone or telegraph employee.9 Technological advances swiftly
outmoded such laws and a number of the states, including New York,
passed statutes prohibiting wiretapping.'0 However, the law still lags
behind electronic progress and, as we have seen from the farce in Mr.
Goldfine's Washington hotel room, at least one side of a telephone con-
versation may be intercepted without actual wiretapping.
Wiretapping is ordinarily accomplished by connecting the tapper's
receiver by wire to the subscriber's line at one of the so-called "bridging
points" on the circuit at some distance from the tapped phone. The
procedure is simple enough, but the tapper must be familiar with the
circuits and the location of bridging points and have the ability to dis-
tinguish which of the many wires found at these points belongs to the
telephone he intends to tap. Once the connection has been made a
recording device may be employed to relieve the tapper of the necessity
of personal monitoring."
New developments in the electronic field are rapidly eliminating the
need for even this much effort by the wire tapper. Induction coils and
high-gain amplifiers make it possible to intercept telephone communica-
tions without any physical contact of wires. An induction coil hidden
near a telephone will pick up both sides of a conversation for the benefit
6 Wharton, Criminal Law § 1718 (12th ed. 1932); Blackstone tells us "Eavesdroppers,
or such as listen under walls or windows or the eaves of a house to hearken after dis-
course, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales, are a common nui-
sance . . . ," Black. Comm. Bk. IV, Ch. 13, § 168.
7 Report of the Committee of Privy Councillors Appointed to Inquire into the Intercep-
tion of Communications, London, H. M. Stationary Office, Cmnd. 283 October, 1957, p.
12, II 32.
8 Id. at f1 31.
9 N.Y. Penal Law § 552.
30 Nineteen states have anti-wiretapping statutes, and in ten of these no exception is
made for wiretapping by law enforcement authorities. The majority of the remaining
states rely on malicious mischief laws which merely prohibit damage to the property of
public utilities. Joint Legislative Committee to Study Illegal Interception of Communi-
cations, Report 26-29 (N.Y. Legislative Doc. No. 53, March 1956) app. B 54-71.
11 Fairfield and Clift, "The Private Eye," Reporter, Feb. 10, 1955, p. 24.
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of a tapper equipped with a short wave radio who may be literally miles
from the telephone itself. Modifications of these supersensitive micro-
phones and transmitters have become so varied that it has been estimated
that $25,000 worth of equipment would be required to check a room for
hidden electronic eavesdropping devices; even then, there would be no
absolute guarantee that the room was clear. Vis-a-vis communication is
not a sure protection from the modern eavesdropper either, for a con-
versation held in a rowboat 300 yards from shore could be picked up
and relayed by radio to any point desired."2
Efforts are being made to meet the new conditions, and New York's
revised statute, for instance, being addressed to eavesdropping whether
the communications are in person or by wire, includes microphonic
"bugging" as well as wiretapping." However, the only federal statute
in the field is the patently inadequate section 605 of the Federal Com-
munications Act which states,
*.. [N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person .... 14
The courts have generally restricted the scope of section 605 to the
employment of devices actually in contact with the telephone system.' 5
However, some decisions have taken a more flexible attitude,0 and it
appears to be beyond question that the Supreme Court would apply the
section to electronic interception of telephone communications where
there had been no actual contact with the wires themselves. In the
recent case of Rathbun v. United States'8 the Court held that intercep-
tion by police officers using an existing extension was not a violation of
section 605; however, the decision turned not on the technical question
12 Shaffer, "Eavesdropping Controls," Editorial Research Reports, Jan. 25, 1956, p. 67 ff.
13 N.Y. Penal Law § 738.
14 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952).
15 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), listening device attached to the wall
not interception; Rayson v. United States, 238 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1956), listening from
adjoining room by electronic device not interception; United States v. Guller, 101 F. Supp.
176 (E.D. Pa. 1951), interception must be effected by intervention of a listening device
in the telephone system. In Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), evidence obtained
by concealment of a radio transmitter is admissible because that technique is outside
of § 605.
16 United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 653 (1940),
where receiver of telephone message had a third party intercept by use of a recording
machine, held within purview of § 605 because of absence of consent of sender; United
States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), use of microphone constituted inter-
ception whether in contact with the telephone or not.
17 The requirement of physical contact with the wires as an indispensable element of
the crime of wiretapping is obviously unrealistic and obsolete. Fairfield and Cift, supra
note 11; see Mellin, "I Was a Wire Tapper," Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 10, 1949, p. 57;
Shaffer, supra note 12.
18 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
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of whether this constituted a wiretap but rather on the point that a party
to the conversation has the right to authorize a third party to listen in
on an existing extension. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Warren.
stated that "the communication itself is not privileged, and one party
may not force the other to secrecy merely by using a telephone."'" He
analogized the use of the extension to holding out the headset itself so
that a third party might overhear. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a pene-
trating dissent, pointed out that the statute speaks of ".... no person not
being authorized by the sender . . . ," and argued that the majority was
twisting the plain meaning of the section by holding that the police
officers listening in on the extension with the "consent of one party"
were, in effect, not "another person" but the alter ego of the receiver
himself.2" His dissent immediately raises the question as to the Court's
attitude in a case where, no extension being handy, the invited police
officers employ a lead into the subscriber's wire or an induction coil
placed near his phone. Presumably the Court would hold such a practice
to be forbidden under the statute and yet, considered realistically, the
difference involved is most superficial.
In the past, wiretapping for the purpose of crime detection has gen-
erally been considered lawful. Federal authorities customarily made
use of the technique during the early decades of this century, and in
1928 the Supreme Court ruled in Olmstead v. United States2' that
admission of evidence so obtained was not in violation of the Fourth
or Fifth Amendments because it did not constitute illegal search or
seizure. In 1934 section 605 became law and thereafter the Court held
that wiretap evidence is not admissible in federal courts.22 Intrastate
as well as interstate telephone communications were covered by the
decisions since the Court quite reasonably concluded that it was impos-
sible for the interceptor to segregate one from the other.2" In the second
Nardone case, in 1939, the Court went further and prohibited the use
of evidence indirectly obtained by wiretapping, characterizing it as the
"fruit of the poisoned tree."2 4
However, the statute speaks of interception and divulgence, and the
decisions do not hold that interception by federal officers in and of itself
is illegal under section 605. There must be interception coupled with
divulgence to constitute a violation of the Act. No federal officer has
'9 Id. at 110.
20 Id. at 111 ff.
21 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
22 Note 3 supra.
23 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
24 308 U.S. at 341.
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ever been prosecuted under the law, and the Justice Department, adopt-
ing the view that it is a unity, has declared that divulgence to a superior
is not unlawful. Constructively, it is the superior and not the subor-
dinate who does the wiretapping. 5 Attorney General William P. Rogers
has stated that "... wiretapping by law enforcement officials is ...
necessary... and . . it is no worse ... when used by proper officials
and subject to adequate safeguards, than is the use of informants, de-
coys, dictaphones, ...and the like-all of which have been accepted
practices for many years.
'26
The loose draftsmanship and inadequacy of the statute, therefore, have
combined with the pressure of necessity upon federal authorities, to pro-
duce a ridiculous paradox. For example, an officer of the Justice De-
partment in Washington, D. C., may lawfully make a wiretap and over-
hear a narcotics racketeer arranging for a shipment of heroin. Action
is taken immediately and the drugs and a group of underlings who
will surely be convicted under the narcotics laws are seized. However,
the only evidence to link the vicious mastermind of the operation to
the crime which he directed is the wiretap, and under the decisions
it may not be used. The "boss" is free to carry on. As long as he con-
fines himself to the telephone, the law will protect him no matter how
widespread is the knowledge of his guilt.
Until recently, the several states were clearly within their rights if
they chose to permit their law enforcement officers to make use of
wiretapping evidence in obtaining convictions. Within the limits of the
Fourteenth Amendment the states alone have the authority to regulate
police matters and formulate rules of evidence for their courts.2 7 New
York by constitutional amendment in 1938 guaranteed the privacy of
wire communications, but provided for interceptions by police officers
where an ex parte court order had been obtained for the purpose."
Thereafter, the legislature provided a procedure for obtaining the court
orders,29 and made it a misdemeanor for an individual to possess wire-
tapping equipment with the intention of using it for unauthorized wire-
taps. 
3 0
The situation in New York was complicated in 1950 by the decision
in the Applebaum case. Mr. Applebaum sued for divorce upon evidence
25 Statement of Attorney General Francis Biddle, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1941, p. 4, col. 2.
26 63 Yale L.J. 792 (1954).
27 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926),
cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1925).
28 N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12, ff 2.
29 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a.
30 N.Y. Penal Law § 552(a).
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obtained by means of recorded wiretaps on his own home telephone,
and it was held that a subscriber was within his rights if he tapped his
own phone "so that his business may not be damaged, his household
relations impaired or his marital status disrupted."'" A prosecution
against the professional wiretapper hired by Applebaum was dismissed
and the way was open for unscrupulous individuals to enter the field
wholesale. That they promptly did so was amply shown by the investi-
gation of a Joint Legislative Committee in 1956.32 The procedure was
being employed not only in the more unsavory variety of divorce mat-
ters, but also as a weapon among business competitors of all types and
sizes. These abuses led the Committee, under the Chairmanship of As-
semblyman Anthony P. Savarese, to recommend remedial legislation which
was signed by Governor Harriman and became law on July 1, 1958. As
a result, eavesdropping by microphone or electronic "bug" is now a crime
as well as wiretapping of telephone communications.3 3 The prohibition
extends to the subscriber of the phone as well as outsiders, overturning
the rule of the Applebaum case. In addition, the court must satisfy
itself of the existence of reasonable grounds before issuing a permis-
sive order to law enforcement authorities, and the order may not run
for more than two months.34 Finally, evidence obtained through illegal
wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping is inadmissible in any civil
action. 35 It is to be noted that such evidence is not made inadmissible
in criminal cases, New York continuing to adhere to the rule of the
Defore case.
3 6
However, the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Bendnti
v. United States37 in December of 1957 places the wiretapping statutes
of the several states under a cloud. Benanti was suspected of peddling
narcotics by the New York police, who obtained a warrant under state
law to tap the telephone of a bar he frequented. They discovered that
it was not narcotics but untaxed spirits that were involved. The evi-
dence was turned over to the Federal authorities and Benanti was sub-
sequently convicted of bootlegging.38 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that section 605 precludes the use in a federal prosecution of
wiretap evidence even where obtained by state officers pursuant to state
31 People v. Applebaum, 277 App. Div. 43, aff'd without opinion, 301 N.Y. 738, 95
N.E.2d 410 (1950).
32 Note 10 supra.
33 Note 13 supra.
34 Note 29 supra.
35 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 345-a.
36 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1925). Court of
Appeals unanimously held that evidence obtained as a result of illegal arrest and search
may be admitted in a criminal case.
37 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
38 United States v. Benanti, 244 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1957).
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law. Going further, the Court said in reference to the New York pro-
visions for police wiretapping ". . . we find that Congress, setting out
a prohibition in plain terms, did not mean to allow state legislation
which would contradict that section and that policy."' 3 9 Taken on its
face, this would seem to bar state legislation that goes beyond the fed-
eral statute.4°
It was this consideration that led justice Hofstadter of the New York
Supreme Court to refuse to entertain any further applications for wiretap
orders under section 813(a) of the New York Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure.41 On the other hand, the refusal of the United States Supreme
Court in Schwartz v. Texas42 to bar the use of wiretap evidence in state
proceedings makes it uncertain, Benanti notwithstanding, that the Court
would now overturn a state conviction based on wiretap evidence 3
Indeed, the Court went out of its way to state that there was no conflict
with the earlier Schwartz case.44 Rather, it would seem, the Court ex-
pects or hopes that the state courts will of their own volition bring their
evidentiary rules in this area into line with those of the federal judi-
ciary.
45
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL RIGHTS
In respect to federal law enforcement, evidence obtained as a result of
wiretapping is clearly inadmissible in federal prosecutions whether
obtained by federal or local authorities. However, federal officers
apparently may lawfully wiretap so long as there is no divulgence, and
the same applies, insofar as any federal restraint is concerned, to private
detectives, business competitors and busybodies, as well as to black-
mailers and other criminals. State police officials, even where authorized
by the state constitution, are clearly violating federal law when informa-
tion obtained by wiretapping is divulged in any manner, including, of
39 355 U.S. at 105.
40 U.S. Const. art. VI, d. 2; N.B.C. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), affirming,
47 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). Federal Communications Act pre-empts the field of
radio broadcasting. However, in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 133 (1942),
the court indicated that the purpose of § 605 was protection of the communications system
rather than individual privacy, thus apparently leaving room for state regulation con-
cerned with the question of secrecy of communications.
41 Matter of Interception of Telephone Communications, 170 N.Y.S.2d 84, 9 Misc. 2d
121 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1958).
42 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
43 The Court, at 355 U.S. 110, cited with approval the F.C.C. regulations which pre-
suppose the right of either party to record a telephone conversation. The gravamen of
the Benanti decision is concerned with the integrity of the system rather than the secrecy
of the communications. See note 40 supra.
44 Id. at 102.
45 The thought was expressed by the court in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
Later, the Supreme Court of California reversed its own previous rule and held that
evidence obtained by use of an illegally concealed microphone in defendant's house should
have been excluded, and noted that the change in the rule was based upon the re-exam-
ination suggested in the Irvine case; People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
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course, its use as evidence in court. Nevertheless, several attorneys
general of the states, among them C. Ferdinand Sybert of Maryland
and Louis Lefkowitz of New York, have indicated that they will con-
tinue to approve wiretapping activities by law enforcement officers until
their state courts declare such activity to be unlawful.40 District Attor-
ney Frank Hogan of New York has also pointed out that Justice Hof-
stadter, in refusing to issue further wiretap orders after the Benanti
case, has actually extended its scope since under section 605 wiretapping
is not illegal until coupled with a divulgence. 47 To further complicate
the picture in New York, the Westchester County Court recently held,
in a case now being appealed, that wiretapping with divulgence was
illegal, even though it had been done pursuant to court order.48 On the
other hand, state authorities are probably outside of section 605 if tech-
niques more subtle than physical tapping of wires are employed.
Such confusion in the law, with its attendant damage to law enforce-
ment and encouragement to criminals, is due in large measure to an
unthinking response to the natural repugnance with which honest men
traditionally regard eavesdropping. It is an area where judgments are
more apt to be emotional than objective. For many people, wiretapping
and electronic interception of communications have the odor of the police
state.49 However, without adequate judicial safeguards, so also have
search and seizure, arrest, imprisonment, money fines, the revocation
of licenses, and other normal procedures that all societies employ in the
protection of their citizens. The United Kingdom, surely not generally
associated in our minds with harsh, arbitrary or totalitarian police
procedures, permits wiretapping by police officers under the authority
of special warrants. So also, subject to certain safeguards and restric-
tions, do Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, West Germany,
Austria and France."° In the United States, despite an alarmingly rapid
increase in the incidence of major crime,51 law enforcement officers may
not avail themselves of the technique or, if they do, the evidence ob-
tained is inadmissible. In our concern with the freedom of the individual
we are permitting the law in this area to become a shield for the wrong-
doer, forgetting that the freedom of the individual is meaningless if he
is to be the prey of criminals.
46 S. Rep. No. 1478, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 29 (1958).
47 N.Y.L.J. Jan. 7, 1958, p. 1, col. 5.
48 People v. Dinan, 172 N.Y.S.2d 496 (Westchester County Ct. 1958). See N.YJJ.
Feb. 19, 1958.
49 Committee of Privy Councillors Report 30, ff 134(11). See note 7, supra.
50 G. Dobry, "Wiretapping and Eavesdropping; a Comparative Survey," J. Int'l Comm'n
Jurists, Vol. I, No. 2, 320 (1958).
51 The national crime rate increased 9.1% from 1956 to 1957 and 23.9% over an average
of the previous five years. Uniform Crime Reports, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, Jan. 1958.
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Cornelius W. Wickersham, Counsel to the Grand Jury Association of
New York County, has pointed out that gangster domination of our
national life depends on the ability of criminal combinations to operate
beyond reach of the law, and states that "... One of the greatest
triumphs for organized criminal activity would be the continued pre-
vention of any enactment of wiretapping legislation for law enforcement
purposes."52 The late Mr. Justice Jackson, then Attorney General of the
United States, declared in 1941 that
monitoring of telephone communications is essential in connection
with investigations of foreign spy rings. It is equally necessary for ...
solving such crimes as kidnapping and extortion . . ., [and] the inter-
ception of communications should in a limited degree be permitted to
Federal law enforcement officers.
53
Former Attorney General Herbert P. Brownell has asserted that every
attorney general from 1932 onward has favored and authorized wire-
tapping by federal officers where serious crimes were involved, and that
both Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman approved
of that policy.5 4 In some quarters, on the other hand, there is a flat
refusal to accept the need for wiretapping under any circumstances.
The American Civil Liberties Union, for example, adheres to its position
of unalterable opposition to wiretapping for any purpose.55
There is, furthermore, a widespread misconception as to the frequency
of police wiretaps. In a recent book Mr. Justice Douglas of the United
States Supreme Court asserted that in 1952 at least 58,000 wiretap
orders had been issued in New York City alone. 5 Actually, in that
year, all five district attorneys and the police department in New York
procured a combined total of only 480 orders! 57 In the United Kingdom,
where wiretapping is employed in criminal cases where warrants are
issued, the number of such warrants averaged slightly under 200 per
year from 1952 through 1956, and never exceeded 241 in any one year.5"
Wiretapping is of very little use in connection with ordinary felonies
and crimes of violence. There is lacking in this sporadic sort of crime
the pattern of continuity necessary for effective wiretap operation by
police officers. It is generally in the more sinister field of large scale,
highly organized and more or less permanent types of criminal activity
52 The Panel, Vol. 27, No. 1, June, 1958, p. 5, col. 2.
53 Hearings Before The Committee on The Judiciary on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099,
77th Cong. 1st Sess. 16-20 (1941).
54 39 Cornell L.Q. 195, 200 (1954).
55 Letter of Sept. 18, 1958 from George E. Rundquist, Executive Director of the New
York Civil Liberties Union, to Peter Megargee Brown.
56 Douglas, Almanac of Liberty, 355 (Doubleday 1954).
57 From a survey conducted by District Attorney Edward S. Silver of Kings County,
New York.
58 Committee of Privy Councillors Report, Appendix I.
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alone that wiretapping is worthwhile. Labor racketeering, 9 gambling,
narcotics and espionage are among the chief categories where it is most
useful. Kidnapping and other extortion schemes, because of their de-
pendence on telephone contacts, are also vulnerable to swift, intelligent
employment of wiretaps.
CONCLUSION
The American public is often impatient because known criminals go
unpunished while living in the extreme luxury their illicit operations
provide. The answer is, of course, that law enforcement authorities must
have evidence to obtain convictions. They may know a man is a crim-
inal, but they cannot prove it. Wiretapping provides a most effective
tool toward obtaining suitable evidence against today's powerful and
ubiquitous criminal combinations.
The first step toward making this valuable weapon again available
against them is federal legislation amending section 605 to authorize
wiretapping by state authorities under state law. Such a bill was intro-
duced by Senator McClellan in January of 1958, 60 but after a second
reading was referred to the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee which took no action on it. A year earlier Representative
Emanuel Celler of New York introduced a more comprehensive bill
which would permit federal officers to wiretap under ex parte court
order, and make evidence so obtained admissible in federal criminal
cases and grand jury proceedings." Although favorably reported to the
full Committee on the Judiciary in May, 1958,62 the bill was not acted
upon before adjournment.
Unquestionably, the time for Congressional action in this area is long
overdue. The real need is for comprehensive legislation of the general
type proposed by Representative Celler. The federal law must be
brought up to date on three bases:
1. There must be a clear and unmistakable prohibition against wire-
tapping which will include the latest electronic devices that have been
devised for the purpose, whether actual contact with the telephone wire
is made or not.
2. Wiretapping must be made available to federal law enforcement
officers proceeding under ex parte orders. Safeguards such as those
provided by the present New York law are an indispensable concom-
59 See "The Anti-Racketeering Act: Labor and Management Weapon Against Labor
Racketeering", 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 965-79 (1957).
60 S. 3013, 85th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1958).
61 H.R. 104, 85th Cong. 1st Sess. (1957).
62 Letter from Hon. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House Committee On The Judiciary,
to F. V. Langan, Exec. Dir., Grand Jury Ass'n of New York County, May 16, 1958.
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itant, and the procedure should be restricted to specified types of crim-
inal activity.
3. The states should immediately have restored to them their tradi-
tional right to have legislation permitting legal interception on court
order of telephone communications involving major crime.
Such legislation will remove the doubt and confusion pervading this
area of the law, discourage crime, and hearten law enforcement author-
ities. It is certain that under the supervision of the courts such reform
of the law will result in not the slightest diminution of the individual
liberties which today's federal courts so zealously guard. Criminal
elements alone will be the losers.
